Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Glen P. Willey v. Rosalind Ann Johnson Willey :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Roger D. Sandack; Attorney for Appellant.
Ellen Maycock; Kruse, Landa and Maycock; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Willey v. Willey, No. 920091 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3008

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
A10
DOCKET NO.

°lZOCQL
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
!

GLEN P. WILLEY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

]
I
]
i
])
)
]

Case No. 920091CA
District Court
No. D91-490-0101
Category No. 16

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY

Appeal From a Final Decree of Divorce Entered by
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah
Honorable David S. Young, District Judge

Roger D. Sandack, 2856
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone
801/533-8383
Attorney for Appellant
Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
50 West 300 South, #800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone 801/531-7090
Attorney for Appellee

OCT 2 31992
M

in

\1

IK-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GLEN P. WILLEY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

;
i
]
)
])
)
]

Case No, 920091CA
District Court
No. D91-490-0101
Category No. 16

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY
Appeal From a Final Decree of Divorce Entered by
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah
Honorable David S. Young, District Judge

Roger D. Sandack, 2856
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone 801/533-8383
Attorney for Appellant
Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
50 West 300 South, #800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone 801/531-7090
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S FACTS

2

REPLY TO ARGUMENTS

4

I.

The "Jones" Factors Were Not Properly Applied

4

Evidence of Need Not Conflicting

6

Standard of Living

7

II. Reply to Reasonableness of Attorney Fee

9

III. Reply to Other Issues

9

CONCLUSION

10

ADDENDUM

12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

13

-i-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991)
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990)

4
....

8

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) . . .

4, 12

Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124
(Utah App. 1988)

7

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.1 (1953 as amended)

-ii-

....

6

RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S FACTS
1.

Mr. Willey complains that appellant is simply

attempting to retry this matter by using only her versions of the
facts to support her arguments.

Yet Mr. Willey does exactly the

same when he recites as a matter of fact that "the parties lived
beyond their means". He then supports this unfounded conclusion
by claiming that "the parties bought a Mercedes in 1987" (which
only he drove and continues to drive); "they refinanced"; "they
borrowed"; "they liquidated"; "they borrowed again".

(Pg* 3 and

4 of Appellee's Brief.)
The facts speak to a more successful and traditional
marital relationship where Mrs. Willey stayed home and acted as
the homemaker, and Mr. Willey earned substantial income and
controlled the finances.

A comparison of income earned as set

forth in Exhibit 34D, (portions of which are restated on page 6
of Appellant's Brief) demonstrate this relationship.

After their

first year of marriage, Mrs. Willey earned approximately
$5,000.00 per year for three years, and then averaged $1,550.00
gross per year for the next five years until their first full
year of separation.

During that same time frame, Mr. Willey

initially averaged $63,500.00 per year, and then, as found by the
Court, $110,000.00 for the next five years.

Contrast those facts

with Mr. Willey's expected assertion at trial that he "urged Mrs.
Willey to work full-time" during the marriage and that her
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refusal to do so was a cause of major disagreement.

Appellee's

Brief at p. 3.
2.

The facts further demonstrate that both parties

voluntarily lived a high standard of living well within their
ability on the substantial income earned during this marriage.
As indicated, they had numerous parties, entertained frequently,
traveled together, lived in a large expensive home, dressed well,
and drove expensive automobiles.

All of this lavish lifestyle

required some degree of financing which was easily satisfied out
of current income.

In the two "lean" years of 1989 and 1990 when

Mr. Willey only made $73,000.00 and $98,000.00, respectively, Mr.
Willey was able to maintain his lifestyle through available
credit and the use of substantial accumulated savings and other
assets.

To suggest that they lived far beyond their means is not

consistent with either the evidence or any finding entered by the
trial court.
3.

When the parties separated, Mrs. Willey did go

back to work at two jobs, the equivalent of full-time work.

She

has always maintained that she would work to support herself
full-time.

Her two jobs included retail sales in a book shop,

three days per week and teaching numerous literature groups at
night.

Had Mrs. Willey not required surgery in August of 1991

her gross earnings would have been the equivalent of full-time
wages at $5.00 per hour.

(TR. p. 58).

-3-

4.

r

Final
is c

is stated, "it

Wi 1 1 oy f *' ' l» i I n I

10

*+ ^ai^
* *^

' vi

~*

M

~

T47 1 1

'

- ^\ <ls

^

ev" «= Brief w h e r e 11
"<-*'!

h^n^fit

"' * I

neither party wai

= i-^i

•

u

evidence concerning Mrs

n- .*::«*r

.dr«».

i. /

»ii^-. <

:

, Late

:
fa<..t

Mrs,

. ;t-v
thf'!*-- wis

u« M'tii
:« • ' •

i r urn

unsubstantiated c o n c l u s i o n .

• M 1 P*- wouJ d ] i ke to have advised the

1

c osts ai id problems she now must

face b e c a u s e O"

nliev

relationship to the c h i l d r e n ,

was u n a b l e to do so.
REPLY TO ARGUMENTS
I•

The "Jones" Factors Were Not P r o p e r l y A p p l i e d .

Mr.

wt

=1-*•

' t t emr 1

s

, regarding M r s , WJ J :*ry ^ sit-^d--

f -

the

t h e o r y that she presented conflicting evidence and .ai^tu L^
the court to m a k e an\

ask

-.

If conflict ;,4^ evidence wa.-> offered (which A p p e l l a n t
denie

incumbent upon the tria

>i

>ake

findings
- . -...

...

elemen

• t.

:

u •

. bindings

••, .H, e s s e n t i a ]

- abused xts d i s c r e t i o n ,

-4-

h^

BH

,

In

All of the three "Jones" factors critical to the
alimony issue are closely interrelated.

The first essential

material element, the needs of the recipient spouse, drive the
consideration of the remaining factors.
include obligations to pay creditors?

Do the spouse's needs

Do her needs include

obligations for the primary care of her natural children?
If Mrs. Willey's needs and the critical elements of
those needs are never considered, a trial court cannot assess the
remaining "Jones" considerations.

Since it was unknown prior to

a sale of their marital home and prior to trial if a deficiency
would be owed on the second mortgage, Mrs. Willey requested, but
the trial court denied, her motion to continue the trial pending
a sale of the home, since to do otherwise invites the court to
engage in unsubstantiated speculation related to her possible
obligations (TR. pp 4-6). That is exactly what happened.
Mr. Willey1s notation at page 13, footnote 1 of his
Brief criticizing Mrs. Willey1s speculation

of the debt owed by

her on the note formerly secured by their home is well taken.
For the same reason, the trial court should not have speculated
on what Mrs. Willeyfs debts would be or on her ability to pay
those debts.

Appellant was attempting to argue the best known

facts available at the time her brief was written, but she agrees
that on this record the size of her obligation and ability to pay
is unknown.

-5-

Tl i is appea
are focused b> * :•

embraces two critical issues, both n* which
« does V-

Arties briefs

primary financiax 01
l" (i II hi ;.)liuul

' hese

analyzing her .til n

-' » •-^ s

aff
.;, iivjiu i^no

c o n s i d e r e d , i f at all,

i

support herseii ^ad Mr. Willey's

contribul 11 mm
Mr.

, i*-h upo- !T*"-U C^do *-.-

.

as amended)

respond thai :

j

*

^! 5-

4

" "~ "

* ^*- t-'

' 1 (1953

Mrs.

Wi

>

addressee

...... provision, however, speak?

husbands

obligation to fiis wile, but to 1 lis separate oDiigaL±un t

ir

c
Mrs.

Wille

while Mr. Wil]«

'

strongly believes, ai.
-^parate legal

Wi

H

obligation to

JM-»»

\nus argues, that

parent , ..v , ontinues

as d divorcing spouse

,M
l^-v*'

!

egal

obligations LU iiei un
- -

~is a^ ar<* ,u ^.uLo uiiu «^'i i jm . -

creditor?

ne

J

-r >

* ;. ; f, *

-;pJ - o » i-'

^

: ae1:

>~f * }
}

disregard her lega]
CM rcumstances.
Evidence of Need Not Conflictin
subm
Mrs.

Exhibit 36D was
court what

.-•

expenses might be if individua.l .ly considered, ___

-6-

comparison with expenses for herself and her children for whom
she has a legal obligation.

The exhibit assumed, for argument

purposes, that she would only be entitled to expend exactly what
Mr. Willey required in his exhibit of monthly expenses (Exhibit
10-P).

Mrs. Willey's comparison exhibit 36-D was intended simply

for argument purposes to demonstrate at least equal needs if the
court was only going to consider her needs alone and not those of
her children.

The only difference between Exhibit 27-D and 36-D

are adjustments made for the sale of the marital home and for
discretionary child care expenses, such as allowances,
extracurricular activities, and other amounts associated only
with the children's care.

Otherwise, Mrs. Willey1s needs remain

the same, now and throughout the trial.
Had the trial court made findings related to Mrs.
Willey's financial needs, the mistakes of fact which the court
made in assessing her ability to contribute to those needs and
the amount her husband should contribute, would have become
apparent.

It is reversible error if the trial court fails to

make specific findings on all material issues unless the facts in
the record are "clear, uncontroverted and capable of supporting
only a finding in favor of the judgment."

Throckmorton v.

Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988).
Standard of Living.

Mrs. Willey's responses and

arguments rests heavily on a recurring theme that Mrs. Willey
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ought to be returned to that standard of living enjoyed by her
prior to her marriage to Mr, Willey in 1980.

She and her

children enjoyed the benefits as long as it lasted; she ought to
return to the life and job skills she knew then.

In Dunn v.

Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990), this Court rejected the
argument that because the wife could not have achieved on her own
a standard enjoyed by her during her marriage, she was
accordingly not entitled to an equal share or consideration of
substantial marital assets.

The various factors to be considered

in fashioning equitable property and support provisions do not
include a consideration that one partner was more economically
productive than the other.
While the Dunn holding applied to a division of marital
assets, its holding bears equal weight upon the implication that
Mrs. Willey return to a standard of the 1980's while Mr. Willey
be free to move forward with substantial resources.
Mrs. Willey supported her husband's move toward greater
financial success during the prime years of her life, giving up
in return employment opportunities which could have been just as
rewarding to her.
Because he now has the opportunity to earn tremendous
income and she does not, why must the court impose a standard for
her which is far below his standard of living?
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II.

Reply to Reasonableness of Attorney Fee.

Mrs. Willey also believes it unfortunate that both
parties had to expend significant fees in the presentation of
this matter before the trial court.

Nowhere, however, did the

trial court find that the fees expended by either party were
unreasonable.

What may be "implicit" to appellee is not implicit

to appellant.

It is unfortunate that Mr. Willey can pay all of

his fees from marital funds, or divert earnings that could have
been used to pay marital debt, without scrutiny of the trial
court, yet Mrs. Willey must demonstrate reasonableness, need and
financial inability to recognize that her expenditures for
attorney fees went to the same purpose and end, to wit: the
dissolution of the marriage.

Mrs. Willey met that burden, but

the court failed to award her all her fees.

The trial court did

not find, implicitly or explicitly, that her fees were
unreasonable.
III. Reply to Other Issues.
Mr. Willey asserts that Appellant's brief violates the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in three respects:
i)

that it fails to indicate the standard of

review,
ii)

does not contain a summary of the arguments;

and
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iii) it contains references to the transcript of
trial rather than the official record.
Appellant's counsel apologizes to the Court for inadvertently
omitting the Summary of Argument section when compiling the
Appellant's Brief in its final version.

That section is now

contained in the Addendum to this brief, with the well known
standards of review which were previously contained in the
docketing statement and which have been correctly recited by
Appellee's Brief.
References to the trial transcript were recited from
the copy which Appellant obtained from the official reporter.
The copy did not have the record pagination and for that, counsel
seeks your forgiveness.
CONCLUSION
Since few assets remained following the dissolution of
this marriage and the liquidation of marital assets, virtually
all of the court's determinations concerning alimony, division of
property, division of debts and award of attorney's fee affect
Mrs. Willey's ability to continue her post-marital life.
Virtually all of the other equitable determinations made by the
trial court have adverse impact upon Mrs. Willey's need for
support and upon a fair determination of Mr. Willey's
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contribution to that need.

Accordingly, it is respectfully urged

that this matter be reversed and remanded for re-trial on all
issues.
DATED this /<%**£ day of October, 1992.

Ro^er D. Sandbjzfk (#2856)
Attorney for Appellant
Rosalind Ann Johnson Willey
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The trial court improperly applied the Jones v.

Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah App. 1985), considerations by
failing to make findings concerning Mrs. Willeyfs needs including
her obligations to her children.

The court's failure affected

not only the other Jones factors, but also a fair consideration
of property and debt distribution.

The standard of review is an

abuse of discretion by the trial court.
2.

The trial court erred in failing to provide Mrs.

Willey consideration for premarital contribution to the parties'
home.

Mrs. Willey alleges an error of law in the application of

the District Court's findings.
3.

Whether the court erred by failing to award a

larger contribution towards necessary attorney's fees and costs.
The standard of review is an abuse of discretion.

-12-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the 2%

day of October, 1992, true and correct

copies Of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT ROSALIND ANN

JOHNSON WILLEY were hand-delivered to the following:
Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
50 West 300 South, #800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

cmw\18075

-13-

